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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
shortly thereafter, and royalties were paid on the basis of this
contractually established unit until 1958. In that year the De-
partment of Conservation, after hoarings on application of
Humble, issued an order creating a forced production unit com-
prising 177.60 acres. The same well which had been the source
of production for the voluntary unit was designated as the unit
well in the forced order of the commissioner. The order also
directed that the tracts included should share in production in
the proportion that the surface acreage of each bore to the
entire acreage within the unit.
The forced and voluntary units were not coextensive, the
former overlapping the latter as to only 101.13 acres. Approxi-
mately 58 acres in the voluntary unit lay outside the forced unit,
and the forced unit included approximately 76 acres of land not
encompassed by the voluntary unit. As a result of the conserva-
tion order, the unit operator was required to pay royalties in the
proportion directed without regard to obligations incurred by it
under the contractual or voluntary unit.
The court did not find it necessary to render a decision on
the merits in this instance.84 However, the questions raised as
to the effect of the conservation order on the contractually estab-
lished unit are significant. The court of appeal solved the prob-
lem by declaring that the conservation order superseded the
voluntarily established unit.8 5
The problems raised by this type of situation are numerous.
It will be interesting to observe the manner of their resolution.
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J. Denson Smith*
In the case of Prevot v. Courtney' it was held that the pur-
34. The original action was a suit by the lessee-unit operator against one lessor
who had refused tendered royalties after establishment of the conservation unit.
The court decided that the rights of parties to the voluntary unit, especially those
of owners of the property not included in the forced unit, would be under direct
consideration in any decision on the merits. If the decision of the court of appeal
were followed, those persons owning mineral and royalty interests on the land
within the contractual unit but not within the forced unit would no longer be
entitled to share in royalties according to the court. Therefore, it was concluded
that those mineral and royalty owners interested in the contractual unit in addi-
tion to the defendant-lessor were indispensable parties to the action, and the suit
was remanded to allow plaintiff-lessee to implead any indispensable parties.
35. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Jones, 135 So.2d 640 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1960).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 241 La. 313, 129 So.2d 1 (1961).
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chaser of an immovable became the owner of the improvements
that had been placed thereon by a former occupant of the prop-
erty. There was nothing of record to put the purchaser on notice
of any claim of adverse ownership. Indeed, the evidence showed
that the former owner had elected to keep the improvements by
virtue of the authority conferred by Civil Code Article 508, and,
therefore, had become indebted for their value.
In Dougherty v. Petrere2 redhibition was granted in the case
of a sale of a house trailer, the roof of which leaked so badly
as to render it uninhabitable. The defect was found to be not
apparent and the purchaser's refusal of an adjustment of the
purchase price was held justifiable. The court's disposition of
the case followed the Code and the jurisprudence. The condition
of the trailer was such as to clearly negative the belief that the
purchaser would have been willing to take the vehicle in its
defective condition. The risk was left where it belonged, on the
entrepreneur.
The case of Gilliam v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co.3
affirmed a position taken earlier by the court of appeal4 that
a lessor who knows of a defect in the leased premises cannot
shield himself behind a contract with his lessee by which the
latter assumes liability for the condition of the premises.
Two cases dealt with problems of eminent domain. In State
v. Guidry5 the court supported the position of the Department
of Highways that it has constitutional power to determine the
necessity and extent of a taking for highway purposes and that
its decision is not subject to judicial review.
In State v. McDuffie6 it was held that offers to purchase,
though bona fide, are not sufficient evidence of market value
and should be excluded from evidence. The court reminded that,
although rentals and income are highly relevant in the absence
of comparable sales, they are not necessarily controlling even
where the property is encumbered by a long-term lease.
2. 240 La. 287, 123 So.2d 60 (1960).
3. 240 La. 697, 124 So.2d 913 (1960).
4. Mitchal v. Armstrong, 13 So.2d 506 (TA. App. Orl. Cir. 1943).
5. 240 La. 516, 124 So.2d 531 (1960).
6. 240 La. 378, 123 So.2d 93 (1960).
